We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs.
Introduction
A well documented phenomenon in common-value auctions is the winner's curse (WC)-a systematic overbidding relative to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) which results in massive losses in the lab.
1 Two recent papers, Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007) , rationalize the WC within theories that retain the BNE assumption that players best-respond to beliefs (hence, we refer to these theories as belief-based) but relax the requirement of consistency of beliefs. Eyster and Rabin introduce the concept of Cursed Equilibrium (CE) in which players' beliefs do not fully take into account the connection between others' types and bids. Crawford and Iriberry use the level-k model which was introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995) . In this model, level-0 (L 0 ) players bid in some pre-specified way and level-k (L k ) players (k = 1, 2, . . .) best-respond to a belief that others are L k−1 .
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In response to Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007) , we investigate experimentally whether the WC in common-value auctions is indeed driven by beliefs. 3 We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, which has the special property of being two-step dominance-solvable. Our experimental design exploits this property. We focus on initial periods of play as this seems like a natural starting point for evaluating belief-based theories.
The paper most closely related to ours is Charness and Levin (2009) . This study finds that the WC is alive and well in an individual-choice variant of the "acquiring a company" game, i.e. in an environment where the WC cannot be rationalized by inconsistent beliefs about other players' behavior.
Three concerns arise in interpreting the results in Charness and Levin (2009).
First, one cannot reasonably expect CE or the level-k model to explain every aspect of behavior. 4 Thus, even if Charness and Levin's setup rules out belief-based explanations we should still expect some anomalies. The key question is: Is the WC more pronounced in environments where it can be rationalized by belief-based explanations than in environments where such explanations are less plausible? If the answer is "yes", the difference could be attributed to the level-k model or CE; if the answer is "no", this casts doubt on the validity of such models. However, Charness and Levin (2009) cannot answer this question because it does not include a regular "acquiring a company" game against human opponents, i.e. an environment of the former type.
In contrast, our paper studies and compares behavior in both types of environments.
Second, the "acquiring a company" game represents a lemons market (see Akerlof (1970) ) and is not a common-value auction. Although both types of environments admit a WC, they are quite different and it is not obvious that Charness and Levin's conclusions readily extend to common-value auctions. However, it is possible that subjects employ very different cognitive mechanisms in interactions with other players-such interactions may trigger all sorts of thought processes about others' reasoning, beliefs, and intentions. Thus, the conclusions from
Charness and Levin (2009) do not necessarily extend to games against human opponents. In our study, subjects play against other people.
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Another related study is Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) which finds a systematic inconsistency between chosen actions and stated beliefs in normal-form games.
This study differs from ours in two important ways. First, it concerns an environment which is very different from common-value auctions. Second, it is based on eliciting subjects' beliefs. In addition, the study cannot distinguish between two possible interpretations: (i) that subjects do not best-respond to beliefs when choosing actions and (ii) that subjects form different beliefs when choosing actions and when stating beliefs.
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We proceed as follows. In section 2, we describe the maximal game and derive the relevant theoretical predictions. In section 3, we describe our experimental design and in section 4 we examine the experimental data. Section 5 concludes. 5 It is plausible that the WC in both types of environments is driven by the same forces. However, given that these are quite different environments, this cannot be taken for granted. 6 In one of our environments, each subject plays against the computer which, however, mimics the strategy of a person (actually, the subject's own past strategy).
7 Another related study is Pevnitskaya (2008) . This study investigates whether deviations from the risk-neutral BNE in first-price private-value auctions is caused by inconsistent beliefs, risk aversion, or probability misperception. All components seem to be at work.
Theoretical Considerations
We begin by describing the maximal game. There are n bidders, each of which privately observes a signal X i that is i.i.d. from a cumulative distribution function
) be the highest of the n signals and let x i and x max denote particular realizations of X i and X max , respectively. Given (x 1 , . . . , x n ), the ex-post common value to the bidders is v(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = x max . Bidders bid in a sealed-bid, second-price auction where the highest bidder wins, earns the commonvalue, x max , and pays the second highest bid. In case of a tie, each tying bidder gets the object with equal probability.
We will say that, given signal x i , a player bidding b underbids/bids her signal/overbids/bids above 10 if
We now state our first result.
Proposition 1 b(x i ) = x i is the unique bid function remaining after two rounds
of iterated deletion of weakly dominated bid functions. 8 In the first round, all bid
The proof is in the appendix. Here, we give the intuition. It's obvious that bidding above 10 is weakly dominated. Underbidding is also weakly dominated since, under the second-price rule, one could lose the auction at a price below one's signal even though the value of the object is greater than or equal to one's signal. Given that no one underbids, b i (x i ) > x i is weakly dominated for any x i , because, in case the highest bid among others is between x i and b i (x i ), i makes non-positive (and possibly negative) profits.
That bidding one's signal is a BNE follows directly from proposition 1. In fact,
we can say more than that (the proof is in the appendix):
Proposition 2
The bid function b(x i ) = x i is the unique symmetric BNE (including mixed strategies). 8 A bid function is weakly dominated if, for some signal, it prescribes a weakly dominated bid. 9 In our experiment, matching of subjects is anonymous and there is no feedback, so it seems implausible that subjects should coordinate on an asymmetric BNE. For more on asymmetric equilibria, see our working paper ???????. best-responds to RL k−1 . The next proposition shows that RL 1 can overbid.
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Proposition 3 The bid function of RL
The proof is in the appendix. It hinges on the fact that, because an RL 0 's bid is uninformative about its signal, RL 1 cannot draw any inference about X max from winning the auction.
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Let us turn to CE. In a χ-CE (χ ∈ [0, 1]), players best-respond to a belief that each other player j, with probability χ, chooses a bid that is type-independent and is distributed according to the ex ante distribution of j's bids and, with probability 
. 12 The behavior of RL k for k ≥ 2 is not uniquely determined. The point, however, is that a RL 1 can rationalize overbidding. 13 Although the assumption of a strictly positive pdf is not satisfied for the discrete distribution in our experiment, we suspect that the proposition nevertheless holds.
14 If signals have the discrete uniform distribution on the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10} and there are two
.
Experimental Design
Treatments and Procedures
The experiment consists of the Baseline, ShowBidFn, and MinBid treatments. The
Baseline treatment consists of two parts. In part I, subjects play the maximal game for 11 periods. In each period, subjects are randomly and anonymously rematched in separate two-player auctions. Each subject's signals for the 11 auctions are drawn with equal probability and without replacement from the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}. 15 Signals are independent across subjects. Subjects can bid anything between 0 and 1000000 experimental currency units (ECU). There is no feedback whatsoever during the experiment. This minimizes any effects from learning. It also ensures that, in any auction, each bidder's prior over the other bidder's signal is the discrete uniform
Part II is similar to part I. The only difference is that each subject i bids against the computer rather than against another subject. The computer, which "receives" a uniformly distributed signal, mimics i's behavior from part I by using the same bid function that i used in part I. For example, if the computer receives signal y, it makes the same bid that i made in part I when she received signal y. In effect, in part II each subject is playing against herself from part I (and knows that this is the case).
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The ShowBidFn treatment is identical to the Baseline treatment except that in part II we explicitly show subjects their bid functions from part I. The MinBid treatment is identical to the Baseline treatment except that subjects are explicitly not allowed to underbid.
We conducted three sessions of the Baseline (62 subjects), two sessions of the ShowBidFn (46 subjects) and one session of the MinBid treatment (26 subjects).
Subjects were students at The Ohio State University who were enrolled in undergraduate Economics classes. The sessions were held at the Experimental Economics Lab at OSU and lasted around 45 minutes. At the start of each session, the experimenter read the instructions for part I aloud as subjects read along. After that, subjects did 15 Our design for part I ensures that each subject receives each signal from the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10} exactly once. In effect, we are eliciting subjects' bid functions. This simplifies the design of part II. 16 Note that although in part II a subject bids against the computer, the bidding strategy of the opponent is that of a person. The fact that this person is herself from part I should only make the cognitive processes of the opponent all the more salient. 
Possible Implications for Belief-Based Theories
In part I of the Baseline and ShowBidFn treatments, underbidding and bidding above 10 are weakly dominated and can hardly be explained by any belief-based theory. The most interesting behavior is overbidding because it leads to a WC (as long as others are also appropriately overbidding) and because it could potentially be explained by belief-based theories. Notice that, in order to explain overbidding, both the level-k model and CE require that beliefs place a positive weight on underbidding, i.e. on weakly dominated bids. Although not implausible, this already puts some strain on belief-based explanations of overbidding.
However, the real test of belief-based theories comes from part II of each treatment and part I of the MinBid treatment. In particular, we argue below that if behavior is driven by beliefs we should observe a reduction in overbidding (i) in part II of each treatment relative to part I and (ii) in part I of the MinBid treatment relative to part I of the Baseline and ShowBidFn treatments. The absence of any such reduction would cast a serious doubt on belief-based theories.
Our argument is based on the assumption that, if behavior is driven by beliefs, these beliefs are at least consistent with the objectively known features of the environment. That is, we assume that a subject's belief in part II is consistent with the fact that the computer uses her own bid function from part I 19 and that a sub- 17 In case a subject made losses which could not be covered by the 10 ECU starting balances, she was paid just her $5 show-up fee. 18 The instructions in the other two treatments are very similar and are available upon request. 19 In the Baseline treatment, this assumption entails that subjects are able to recall their bidding behavior from part I (which was just a few minutes ago) or perhaps, at least, whether they tended to underbid, bid their signal, overbid, or bid above 10. In the ShowBidFn treatment, subjects don't ject's belief in the MinBid treatment is consistent with the fact that the opponent cannot underbid. Later, we will consider alternative interpretations of belief-based theories under which beliefs can be at odds with the objectively known features of the environment.
Consider a subject i who overbids (for all signals) in part I of one of the three treatments. 20 From proposition 1, it follows that bidding her signal is a best-response in part II. Although underbidding may not be a best-response, it is at least a response in the right direction. 21 If i continues to overbid but corrects her overbidding downwards, this may or may not be a best-response 22 , but again it is a response in the right direction. On the other hand, if i continues overbidding without a downward correction or even starts bidding above 10 in part II, she is clearly not best-responding to her behavior from part I. The bottom line is that, if i's behavior is driven by beliefs, we should observe a downward correction of bids in part II relative to part I.
In part I of the MinBid treatment, anything other than bidding one's signal is weakly dominated. Thus, if behavior is driven by beliefs, we would expect a reduction in the frequency and (average) magnitude of overbidding relative to part I of the Baseline and ShowBidFn treatments.
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Let us turn to three interpretations of belief-based theories under which beliefs can be at odds with the objectively known features of the environment. The first interpretation is that subjects are using some simple rule of thumb which leads them to behave "as if" they were best-responding to beliefs. For example, a player using a rule like "bid based on the expected value conditional on my signal and ignore everything else" would behave just like a fully cursed or a RL 1 player . Because subjects do not deliberately form beliefs, the beliefs describing their behavior could need to recall anything as they are explicitly shown their bid functions. 20 To be precise, overbidding is not possible for signal 10: a subject can underbid (except in the MinBid treatment), bid her signal, or bid above 10. Therefore, the correct statement is "a subject i who overbids for all signals 0-9 and bids above 10 for signal 10".
21 Of course underbidding is not possible in the MinBid treatment. 22 For overbidding in part II to be a best-response, i would need to shift her bid function in part II, b II i (·), downwards in a way that, for all signals x i , none of the bids she made in part I lie in
Otherwise, there's a positive probability that she wins the auction and loses money. 23 In the MinBid treatment, a subject's available bids depend on her type so that CE is not formally defined. Nevertheless, our point remains valid: if subjects' behavior is driven by beliefs (whether these beliefs are appropriately redefined cursed beliefs or other beliefs), we should observe a reduction in overbidding.
be at odds with objectively known features of the environment. Thus, subjects in any of our environments could behave "as if" they had cursed or RL 1 beliefs.
However, note that this interpretation requires that the rule of thumb be rigid across environments. For example, a subject using the above rule of thumb needs to ignore the opponent's bidding strategy just as much in part II as in part I even though in part II it is her own past bidding strategy (which is even explicitly shown to her in the ShowBidFn treatment).
The second and third interpretations pertain to CE. According to the second interpretation, cursed players do not fully think through the connection between others' types and bids. As a result, they come up with cursed beliefs to which, however, they best-respond by appropriately conditioning the expected value of the object on winning the auction. Under this interpretation, CE would explain behavior in our experiment only if players equally fail to realize the connection between others' types and bids when bidding against other people whose bids are unrestricted, against their own bidding strategy (even when it is shown to them), and against other people who are explicitly not allowed to underbid.
According to the third interpretation, players are aware of others' type-contingent strategies but underappreciate the information content of winning the auction. Under this interpretation, CE could explain overbidding in any of the environments of our experiment.
24 The problem with this interpretation is that, rather than being about inconsistent beliefs, it is about a failure to properly update the expected value of the object conditional on winning. Such a failure is not at all part of the formal definition of CE according to which players perfectly update given their (albeit cursed) beliefs. 
Results
We start by studying and comparing behavior in parts I and II within each treatment.
After that, we compare behavior between part I of the Baseline and ShowBidFn treatments and part I of the MinBid treatment.
Behavior in Part I and Part II
We start by placing each bid b, given signal x, in one of the following categories: (i) subjects who fall in neither of these four classes are classified as Indeterminate.
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We start the analysis with the Baseline treatment. Table 1 shows how many subjects were in each class in part I (last column) and part II (last row). The table also shows how subjects switched between classes from part I to part II. For example, the entry in the first row and third column shows that 2 subjects who were Underbidders in part I became Overbidders in part II. Based on the table, we can state:
26 Actually, for signal x=10, a bid needs to be above 10.25 in order to fall in category (iv); a bid 9.75 ≤ b ≤ 10.25 falls in category (ii). We ignore this in our notation.
27 Counting only bids which are precisely equal to the signal in category (ii) (and adjusting the other categories appropriately) does not change any of our results.
28 Using 7 or 8 (instead of 6) class-consistent decisions as the cutoff for a player to be assigned to a class doesn't affect the analysis much (apart from increasing the number of Indeterminate subjects).
Result 1 (1) In part I, a large percentage of subjects make a weakly dominated bid (b < x − 0.25 or b > 10) in at least 6 (out of 11) auctions (30.7%).
(2) In part I, Overbidders are the largest class (40.3%). (3) Only a minority of Overbidders from part I become Signal-bidders or Underbidders in part II (24%). (4) The majority of Overbidders from part I remain Overbidders in part II (56%).
For a large proportion of subjects, behavior can hardly be explained by beliefbased theories (point (1)). However, the largest proportion of subjects in part I are Overbidders. These subjects' behavior could potentially be driven by beliefs. For subjects who are Overbidders in parts I and II, we find that only 23% of bids in part II are best-responses to part I behavior. These subjects are foregoing, on average, 5.62 ECU (median is 4.07 ECU) in expected profits by not behaving optimally in part II. Figure 1 plots, for each signal, the median bid in part I (circles) and part II (stars).
31 Based on the figure, we see no downward correction of bids in part II. We can state:
Result 2 For subjects who are Overbidders in parts I and II, we find that:
(1) In part II, they forego substantial expected profits.
(2) In part II, there is no evidence of a downward correction of bids.
29 This percentage includes all Underbidders and Overbidders, as well as 4 Indeterminate subjects. 30 The one Overbidder from part I who becomes an Above-10-bidder in part II is clearly not (best-)responding to her behavior from part I. In fact, she foregoes 29.64 ECU in expected profits by not behaving optimally in part II. 31 We plot median, rather than average, bids because averages are distorted by bids above 10. 
Baseline and ShowBidFn vs. MinBid
If behavior is driven by beliefs, we would expect a reduction in the frequency and We investigate experimentally whether belief-based theories can explain the WC in initial periods of play. 35 The main idea of our approach is to compare behavior in an environment where overbidding can be rationalized by belief-based theories with behavior in environments where belief-based explanations are less plausible. We observe no reduction in overbidding in the latter environments. We conclude that, unless one is willing to accept that (i) subjects use a rule of thumb which leads them to behave "as if" they were best-responding to beliefs and which is fixed across the environments in our study,
(ii) subjects equally fail to realize the connection between others' types and bids in all environments in our study, or (iii) CE, contrary to its formal definition, can be interpreted as being about improper updating rather than about inconsistent beliefs, our results cast a serious doubt on belief-based explanations of the WC in initial periods of play.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
First round of deletion of weakly dominated bid functions:
It's obvious that bidding above 10 is weakly dominated. Under the second-price rule, for any x i , any bid strictly below x i is also weakly dominated (by bidding x i ) since one could lose the auction at a price below x i even though x max ≥ x i . Therefore, we can delete all bid
Second round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies: Suppose that bidder i
with signal x i considers bidding b + > x i . In the event that bidding x i wins, bidding b + rather than x i doesn't matter. In the event that bidding b + doesn't win, bidding b + rather than x i also doesn't matter. 36 Under standard assumptions on F (·), we could simply invoke proposition 1 in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), so that no proof would be necessary. However, these assumptions do not hold in the case of the discrete distribution in our experiment.
37 Of course, any bid function which differs from b(x) = x only on a set of measure zero will also be a symmetric BNE. ), where int(·) gives the integer part of a real number (s 3 (·) is depicted in the left graph in figure 3 ). Let
Because A 2 k consists of finitely many rectangles like ABCD in figure 3 (ABCD includes its boundaries, except for point D), it follows that at least one of these rectangles has positive measure. Assume, without loss of generality, H(ABCD) > 0.
We will show that, for a positive measure (wrt H) of points (x, b) ∈ ABCD, bidding b given signal x is strictly worse than bidding x because there is a positive probability that one will lose the auction to a bid strictly below 
. The third and fifth equalities follow from the (countable) additivity of probability measures.
there is a positive probability of a tie at b. The proof that we cannot have H(U) > 0 is analogous so that only a brief outline is provided. Assume that H(U) > 0. Let S k (·) be the step function, defined by
is depicted in the right graph in figure 3 ). Then, we show analogously to above that a rectangle of the sort EF GK in figure 3 , has positive
for a positive measure (wrt H) of points (x, b) ∈ EF GH, bidding b given signal x is strictly worse than bidding x because there is a positive probability that one will win the auction at a price strictly above x max .
Proof of proposition 3
Let B denote the highest bid among the n − 1 subjects other than i. Given X i = x i , subject i chooses her bid, b, in order to maximize 41 :
The second equality follows, because (i) others' bids (and B in particular) are not informative about X max , and (ii) X i is not informative about others' bids (and about B in particular Caution: This is a serious experiment and talking, looking at others' screens, or exclaiming aloud are not allowed. Should you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Part I
1. In part I of this experiment, we will create a series of auctions in which you will act as bidders for a fictitious item. In each auction, you will be paired randomly with another bidder. A single item will be auctioned off with the two of you as bidders.
Your pairings will vary from auction to auction and will remain anonymous.
2. In each auction, you will receive a signal (call it X) and the bidder that you are paired with will also receive a signal (call it Y). X and Y are determined randomly and will lie between 0 and 10. Each whole number within this interval (i.e. 0,1,2,.9,10) has an equal chance of being drawn. In addition, the value of X has no bearing on the value of Y: no matter what the value of X, each whole number between 0 and 10 is equally likely to be the value of Y. The value of the item that is auctioned (call it V) is determined as THE LARGER of the two signals, X and Y.
Prior to bidding in each auction, you will learn X (but not Y); the bidder you are paired with will learn Y (but not X).
Example 1: Suppose you learn that X=6 and the bidder you are paired with learns that Y=4. Then the value of the item is V = 6 ECU.
Example 2: Suppose you learn that X=1 and the bidder you are paired with learns that Y=9. Then the value of the item is V= 9 ECU.
Market organization:
In each auction you will submit a bid for the item. The high bidder gets the item and makes a profit equal to the difference between the value of the item and the second highest bid. That is, for the high bidder:
PROFITS = V -(SECOND HIGHEST BID)
If the difference is negative, it represents a loss.
If you do not make the high bid, you will earn zero profits. In this case, you neither gain nor lose money from bidding on the item. 4 . Your earnings for part I of the experiment will equal the sum of the profits you made in each auction in part I. (Because your profits in any auction could be negative, your earnings for part I could also be negative.) 5 . Even though the computer will keep track of your earnings in each auction, you will not be given any feedback about the outcome of the individual auctions during the experiment.
6. No one may bid less than 0.00 ECU for the item, and bids must be rounded to two digits after the decimal point. You will have 1 minute to place your bid in each auction.
In case of a tie for the high bid, the winner is chosen randomly (50-50 chance).
The price the winner pays will be the second highest bid (which is the same as the high bid in case of a tie).
Let us summarize the main points: 6. No one may bid less than 0.00 ECU for the item, and bids must be rounded to two digits after the decimal point. You will have 1 minute to place your bid in each auction.
In case you tie with the computer for the high bid, you win the item with 50% chance. If you win the item, you pay a price equal to the second highest bid (which is the same as the high bid in case of a tie).
We can summarize by saying that the rules for part II are similar to those for part I. The difference is that now you are bidding not against another participant but against the computer which mimics your bidding behavior from part I.
Any questions?
